Copyright\u27s Compilation Conundrum: Modernizing Statutory Damage Awards for the Digital Music Marketplace by Wilson, Damias A.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 85 
Number 3 Volume 85, Summer 2011, Number 3 Article 7 
April 2014 
Copyright's Compilation Conundrum: Modernizing Statutory 
Damage Awards for the Digital Music Marketplace 
Damias A. Wilson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Wilson, Damias A. (2011) "Copyright's Compilation Conundrum: Modernizing Statutory Damage Awards 
for the Digital Music Marketplace," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 85 : No. 3 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol85/iss3/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
COPYRIGHT'S COMPILATION
CONUNDRUM: MODERNIZING STATUTORY
DAMAGE AWARDS FOR THE DIGITAL
MUSIC MARKETPLACE
DAmIAS A. WILSONt
INTRODUCTION
How many songs are on your iPod? For many, it is much
easier to answer that question than it is to answer, how many
albums do you own.' In recent years, the internet has
revolutionized the way the world buys and listens to its music.2
Consumers recognize the raw talent, hard work, and sacrifice
that artists pour into their music, and that recognition has
turned the music industry into a major sector of the United
States economy.3 The United States government has a long-
' Notes & Comments Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2012, St.
John's University School of Law; B.A., 2005, Stony Brook University. Thank you to
Professor Jeremy Sheff for his insight and guidance; to my loving wife, Mary, whose
patience and support made writing this Note possible; and to my mother, Barbara,
for instilling in me a desire to always keep learning.
1 According to the United States Copyright Office, sales of albums dropped by
nearly 200 million between 2000 and 2006, while over 100 million iPods were sold
during the same time period. Ensuring Artists Fair Compensation: Updating the
Performance Right and Platform Parity for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 18 (2007) [hereinafter Performance Right Hearings]
(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
2 A 2008 study by Forrester Research predicted that digital music sales are
expected to grow from eighteen percent to forty-one percent of total music sales,
while sales of physical CDs are expected to shrink from sixty-four percent to forty
percent of the market. Brian Braiker, What Will the Music Industry Look Like in
Five Years?, ROLLINGSTONE.COM, (Dec. 3, 2008, 2:37 PM), http://www.rollingstone.
com/musidnews/14844/92080. These estimates are seen as conservative, as Atlantic
Records reported in 2008 that fifty-one percent of its total music sales already come
from digital sales. See id.
According to 2007 United States Census Bureau statistics, sound recording
industries generated $15,729,079,000 in total receipts and employed 27,067 paid
employees. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ECONOMIC CENSUS: INDUSTRY STATISTICS
SAMPLER: NAICS 5122, SOUND RECORDING INDUSTRIES (2007), available at
http://www.census.gov/econ/industry/hierarchy/i5122.htm.
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standing tradition of rewarding the hard work and sacrifice that
is involved in the creative process with copyright protection.
Among the rights protected by copyright law is the exclusive
right to reproduce and distribute copies of the copyrighted work.5
The core purposes of the exclusive rights granted by copyright
protection are to promote and reward artistic creation' and
discourage infringement.' Recently, however, infringers have
thrived because the marketplace for music has largely shifted to
the internet,' and the law has struggled to respond.9
Infringement, which involves copying and distributing
copyrighted works without the owner's permission, is more of a
problem today than ever before.o The dawn of the digital era
introduced to infringers an entirely new means of copying songs
and instantly distributing them to millions of consumers." In
recent years, digital piracy has emerged as a parasitic means by
which infringers can thrive, and the government's current
approach is ill-prepared to tackle the problem.12 Digital piracy is
4 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, at OV-1
(2011) ("[Tlhe very first Congress began federal copyright protection in 1790.").
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
6 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good.").
I See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) (providing injunctions for infringement);
17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (West 2011) (providing statutory damages for infringement);
17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006 & Supp. II) (providing criminal penalties for infringement).
8 See Performance Right Hearings, supra note 1, at 30 ("In the absence of
corrective action, new technologies will pose an unacceptable risk to the survival of
what has been a thriving music industry.").
' See David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV.
1233, 1238 (2004) ("[I]n the past decade ... [the 1976 Copyright Act's] amendments
no longer in the main qualify as formal successes; rather, they routinely consist of
bloated provisions that do not meet the various criteria of formal lawmaking
success.").
"o See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, § 503(4), 122 Stat. 4256, 4279 (2008) [hereinafter "PRO-
IP Act"] ("[T]he growing number of willful violations of existing Federal criminal
laws involving counterfeiting and infringement ... is a serious threat to the long-
term vitality of the United States economy and the future competitiveness of United
States industry .... ); see also id. § 503(5) ("[T]errorists and organized crime utilize
piracy, counterfeiting, and infringement to fund some of their activities. . . .").
11 See Zoe Argento, Interpreting Chamberlain's "Reasonable Relation" Between
Access and Infringement in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 2008 B.C. INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. F. 102902, at *3.
12 Markup of H.R. 4279, Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual
Property Act of 2008 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5 (2008)
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among the costliest crimes facing the United States today,13
draining billions of dollars from one of the largest sections of the
nation's economy."
Attempting to regulate this twenty-first-century problem
with 1976 legislation has left the judiciary in a state of confusion.
The 1976 Copyright Act allows plaintiffs to seek statutory
damages, 5 an avenue of recovery that is common in copyright
litigation. The award of statutory damages makes sense when
dealing with pirates who have willfully infringed the copyright of
another because actual damages are often difficult, if not
impossible, to calculate.'6 Difficulties with calculating actual
damages to the copyright owner and profits made by the
wrongdoer arise, first, because it is difficult to know how many
additional sales the copyright owner would have had if the
infringing copies were not available for free download; and
second, because the illicit nature of the pirate's activities make
calculating the wrongdoer's profits difficult." In response to
these difficult evidentiary situations, Congress provides courts
the option to award statutory damages, eliminating the need for
plaintiffs to prove actual damages.'8  Confusion over whether,
and to what extent, statutory damages should be awarded,
however, has led to results that are "frequently arbitrary,
inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes grossly excessive.""
One source of inconsistent and arbitrary results in awarding
statutory damages is the last sentence of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1),
also known as the compilation clause of the 1976 Copyright Act.
[hereinafter PRO-IP Markup] (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary) ("[Tihe problem is that counterfeiting and piracy, both
uploading and downloading illegally, is growing at a much faster rate than our
enforcement efforts can keep pace.").
13 See id. at 4 ("[Clounterfeiting and piracy costs the United States economy
somewhere in the neighborhood of $250 billion every year and results in a loss of
750,000 American jobs. These, we think, are conservative estimates.").
14 See id. ("The General Accounting Office reports that intellectual property
accounted for an average of 18 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product and 40
percent of the U.S. exports of goods and services in 2003 and 2004. An estimated 18
million workers, 13 percent of our labor force, are in industries that rely on
intellectual property protection.").
15 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c) (West 2011).
16 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04.
17 See id.
1s See 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1).
19 Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law:
A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009).
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The compilation clause treats all parts of a compilation as a
single work for the purposes of statutory damages. 20 The circuit
courts have taken two markedly different approaches to the
interpretation of the term "compilation" that would yield
conflicting results in the digital music context. One approach,
used by the Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals,
is a broad interpretation of the term "compilation" that hinges on
the question of "whether the plaintiff-the copyright holder-
issued its works separately, or together as a unit."2 ' The Second
Circuit has held that the willful infringement of an album,
regardless of how many copyrighted songs appear on the album,
entitles the copyright owner to a single statutory damage
award.22 This interpretation is flawed because it is poorly
adapted to the modern digital market place, which allows pirates
to copy individual songs and sell them apart from the album on
which the song was released. This interpretation offers a
bargain to the pirate who can profit from fifteen or twenty songs
while exposing himself to only one award of statutory damages.
The other approach, used by the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals, is a
"functional test" to determine whether each work has
"independent economic value" apart from the compilation and is
thus capable of its own copyright life.2 3 While the independent
economic value test corrects the Second Circuit's outdated view of
the compilation clause, it is also lacking because it does not make
a distinction between commercial infringers, who willfully
infringe for profit, and individuals, who merely download songs
for personal use and are often unaware of the potentially severe
civil penalties for their actions. Without such a distinction, the
major concern is that the potential for unfairly punishing
"personal users" outweighs the benefits of awarding damages on
a per-song instead of a per-album basis. The conflicting
approaches-regarding whether to treat songs on an album as
20 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) ("For the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a
compilation or derivative work constitute one work.").
21 Bryant v. Media Rights Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 656 (2010).
22 See id. ("Based on a plain reading of the statute, therefore, infringement of an
album should result in only one statutory damage award. The fact that each song
may have received a separate copyright is irrelevant to this analysis.").
23 See, e.g., Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116-17 (1st
Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 85:11891192
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individual works or single works for the purposes of statutory
damages-exist mainly because the text of the compilation clause
of the 1976 Copyright Act is poorly equipped to deal with the
modern-day problem of digital piracy.2 4
Changes in technology have always driven changes in
copyright law.25 In response to the expansion of internet
commerce, Congress has enacted numerous amendments to the
1976 Copyright Act. The most recent such enactment is the
Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property
Act of 2008 ("PRO-IP Act"), which amended the 1976 Copyright
Act in order to promote the policies of protecting owners and
discourage illegal infringement. 2 7  The PRO-IP Act initially
contained a section that would have eliminated the compilation
clause and essentially replaced it with the independent economic
value test.28 That section, however, was dropped before the PRO-
IP Act was adopted. 2 9  This decision was appropriate because
simply striking the compilation clause without addressing the
distinction between commercial infringers and personal users
creates a greater potential for unfairly disproportionate
judgments against the latter. The result, however, is that the
compilation clause has remained unchanged since its enactment
in 1976.
This Note argues that Congress should adopt an amendment
to the Copyright Act that distinguishes between "collections" and
"compilations" for the purpose of statutory damages. In order to
24 See PRO-IP Markup, supra note 12. See also Bryant, 603 F.3d at 142 ("We
cannot disregard the statutory language simply because digital music has made it
easier for infringers to make parts of an album available separately.").
25 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984)
("From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant
changes in technology."); see also ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A.
LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 414 (5th ed.
2009) ("Since the advent of the printing press, advances in the technologies for
creating and distributing works of authorship have played a critical role in shaping
copyright law.").
26 See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1307-10 (listing the two dozen amendments to
the 1976 Copyright Act enacted between 1992 and 2002).
2 See Pro-IP Markup, supra note 12, at 4 (stating that the PRO-IP Act will
"make changes to the intellectual property law to enhance the ability of IP owners to
effectively enforce their rights.").
28 H.R. 4279, 110th Cong. § 104 (2007); see infra Part I.C and accompanying
notes.
29 Kevin O'Scannlain & Jim Halpert, Playing Hardball with Soft IP Legislation,
DLA PIPER (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.dlapiper.com/playinghardball/.
2011] 1193
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
avoid exacerbating the problem of already high statutory
damages, the amendment should also clearly establish a three-
tiered statutory-damage scheme that would cover innocent
infringement, knowing infringement, and willful infringement for
commercial advantage or private financial gain. Part I briefly
traces the evolution of statutory damages for copyright
infringement over the last hundred years. Part II analyzes the
confusion surrounding the two opposing views that the federal
courts currently take when interpreting the compilation clause
and the problems that arise when assessing statutory damages
awards for the infringement of digital sound recordings.
Finally, Part III proposes a two-part statutory solution
that is designed to add clarity and certainty in cases involving
modern digital distribution methods, while recalibrating the
maximum damages available according to different degrees of
infringement. Such a system will hinder further increases in
excessive awards against relatively innocent individuals. This
solution is consistent with the Copyright Act's criminal
treatment of infringers and Congress' prior enactments in this
area. It also accords with the tripartite purpose of statutory
damages30 and simultaneously addresses the major failures of the
current approaches. First, it tackles these shortcomings by
better satisfying the core purposes of protecting the copyright
owner and discouraging willful infringement in the digital
context by closing the "bulk discount" loophole, which encourages
infringers to take multiple songs without the risk of incurring
higher levels of damages. Second, this solution is narrowly
tailored to meaningfully limit maximum penalties according to
the nature of an end-user's infringement.
3o See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (D.
Minn. 2010) ("[SItatutory damages for copyright infringement are not only
restitution of profit and reparation for injury, but also are in the nature of a penalty,
designed to discourage wrongful conduct.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
1194 [Vol. 85:1189
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I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND STATUTORY
DAMAGES SINCE 1909
A. The Copyright Act of 1909
Congress built the Copyright Act of 1909 upon the
foundation of copyright law established in the original Copyright
Act of 1790.31 Among the exclusive rights it granted copyright
owners were those of reproducing and distributing the
copyrighted work. 2 Copying or distributing these works, without
the copyright owner's permission, is known as copyright
infringement. 3 The driving force behind copyright law in these
early times was the expansion of mechanical reproduction of
copyrighted works, including music and printed materials,34
technological breakthroughs that allowed infringers to copy and
distribute works to bigger audiences much faster than before.
The 1909 Act provided expanded protections to copyright owners
in the face of this growing threat of infringement.35
Driven by the policy of protecting copyright owners, the 1909
Copyright Act established the first allowance for statutory
damages at the election of the plaintiff.36 The 1909 Act allowed a
plaintiff to sue for actual damages plus the profits made by the
infringer, or statutory damages "in lieu of' actual damages. 37 It
also increased the total amount of statutory damages a plaintiff
could seek and instituted a "per infringing act" basis for
calculating damages, allowing for damages for each separate act
of infringement rather than the "per-sheet" basis that had
previously been employed.3 ' This approach yielded a far more
punitive approach to damages than the previous per-sheet
method.
a' See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 2-4 (1909).
32 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
33 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner . .. is an infringer of the copyright. . .
34 See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7-8.
1 See id. at 8-9.
1 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349 § 25, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) ("[I1f
any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright
laws of the United States such person shall be liable . . [tlo pay to the copyright
proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered. . . or in lieu
of actual damages and profits such damages as to the court shall appear to be
just. . . .").
3 Id.
3 Id.
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The 1909 Copyright Act established criminal and civil
penalties for certain types of infringement and for certain,
specific types of infringed works. For example, the 1909 Act
defined infringing copyrights "willfully and for profit" as a
misdemeanor offense.3 9 The Act also contained specific damage
guidelines by the type of work, including "ten dollars for every
infringing copy" of a painting, statue, or sculpture; "fifty dollars
for every infringing delivery" of a sermon or lecture; and "ten
dollars for every infringing performance" of a musical
composition.4 0 The 1909 Copyright Act did not contain any
limitation on damages for compilations or derivative works.4 1
B. The Copyright Act of 1976
Congress began to contemplate changes to the Copyright Act
in 1955 in order to keep up with technology, particularly sound
recording and broadcasting, which made it easier for pirates to
copy and distribute infringing works.4 2 In 1971, in response to
"the staggering volume of record and tape 'piracy,'" Congress
enacted an amendment to the 1909 Act that recognized "sound
recordings" as copyrightable material.4 3 Then, in 1976, Congress
enacted a major overhaul that expanded copyrights' scope and
duration, but increased compulsory licensing and made copyright
enforcement more difficult by imposing numerous exemptions
and restrictions.44
The Copyright Act of 1976 increased the maximum amount
that a plaintiff could seek for statutory damages, but it limited
that increase in amount by adopting the compilation clause,
3 See id. § 28. Willful infringement "for ... commercial advantage or private
financial gain" is still a criminal offense. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp.
II).
4 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 25, 35 Stat. 1075.
41 See Bryant v. Media Rights Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 142 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 656 (2010) ("In Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, we held
that each separately copyrighted song from the musical Jesus Christ Superstar could
be the subject of a separate statutory damage award because each song could 'live
[its] own copyright life.' In Stigwood, however, we were awarding statutory damages
pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1909, which provided for a separate statutory
damage award 'for each infringement that was separate'; the Copyright Act of 1909
did not expressly limit the number of awards available for infringement of a
compilation.") (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
42 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.10.
43 See id.
4 See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 25, at 415.
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which states, "For the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of
a compilation or derivative work constitute one work."4 5 Prior to
the 1976 Act, plaintiffs could seek statutory damages for each
work infringed, regardless of whether the work was part of a
larger collection. 46 The 1976 Act includes "collective works" 47 in
its definition of "compilation."4 8
C. PRO-IP Act of 2008
During the years since the Copyright Act of 1976 took effect,
myriad technological breakthroughs have forced Congress
to respond to new avenues of infringement. Examples of
the piecemeal approach Congress has taken include the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1982,49 the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992,s0 the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995,1 and the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act.5 2  Each time, Congress cited the familiar policies of
protecting copyright owners from new threats posed by
technological advances and discouraging the spread of
infringement. It did so most recently when it enacted the PRO-
IP Act of 2008.53
The PRO-IP Act of 2008 was enacted in response to the
devastating effects that piracy and counterfeiting have had on
the economy, particularly through the use of digital means of
production and distribution.5 4 Congress explicitly recognized the
4 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (West 2011).
46 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
47 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2011) ("A 'collective work' is a work, such as a
periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions,
constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a
collective whole.").
4 Id. ("A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a
way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.
The term 'compilation' includes collective works.").
49 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (2006).
5o 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2006).
51 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 106, 114-15 (West 2011).
52 Digital Milenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
53 See Pro-IP Markup, supra note 12, at 4-5 (statement of Rep. John Conyers,
Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("[The PRO-IP Act] will ... make
changes to the intellectual property law to enhance the ability of IP owners to
effectively enforce their rights. It will make it easier to criminally prosecute repeat
offenders .... ).
61 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
2011] 1197
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problem of how to treat statutory damages in a way that would
make the remedy more appropriate in the current marketplace,
but has yet to reach a conclusion." The version of the PRO-IP
Act that was initially brought before the House of
Representatives contained a section that would strike the
compilation clause from 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) and replace it with
a definition that stated:
A copyright owner is entitled to recover statutory damages for
each copyrighted work sued upon that is found to be infringed.
The court may make either one or multiple awards of statutory
damages with respect to infringement of a compilation . . .. In
making a decision on the awarding of such damages, the court
may consider any facts it finds relevant ... including whether
the infringed works are distinct works having independent
economic value.56
This section of the PRO-IP Act was dropped by the House
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property during a March 6, 2008 markup."
Opponents of the section voiced concern that individuals and
legitimate businesses might be crushed by unduly high awards
for unintended infringement." Ultimately, the Subcommittee
decided that the statutory language of section 104 was not
properly tailored to correct the problems of the compilation
clause, and it left the problem to be resolved at a later date after
further deliberation.5 9
" See PRO-IP Act Markup Pulls 'Compilation' Provision, Narrows Forfeiture,
WASHINGTON INTERNET DAILY, Mar. 7, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 4789656 (" 'It
was clear more time was needed to identify the appropriate legislative solution' to
the issue of disproportionately low damages for infringing compilations, he said,
promising 'ongoing discussions' on a substitute provision.") (quoting Rep. Howard
Berman, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property of the House Committee
on the Judiciary)).
56 H.R. 4279, 110th Cong. § 104 (2007).
1 O'Scannlain & Halpert, supra note 29.
58 See id.
6 See PRO-IP Act Markup Pulls 'Compilation' Provision, Narrows Forfeiture,
supra note 55.
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II. THE STRUGGLE To APPLY THE COMPILATION CLAUSE
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
A. What Exactly Is a "Compilation"?
The Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals's
recent decision in Bryant v. Media Right Productions, Inc.co
rejected the independent economic value test, which had been
adopted by the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits of the
United States Court of Appeals when faced with the question of
whether independent works that are part of a greater collection
qualify as a compilation for the purposes of calculating statutory
damages under the 1976 Copyright Act.6 ' As a result of the
decision in Bryant, there is doubt and confusion as to which
standard will apply when cases arise outside of the Second
Circuit involving the digital copying and distribution of sound
recordings.
1. The Independent Economic Value Test
In 1976, the Second Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals became the first circuit court to consider how to assess
statutory damages when multiple copyrights in songs on an
album are infringed in Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly.6 2
At issue in Stigwood was whether independent songs from the
rock opera "Jesus Christ Superstar" could be considered
independent works for the purposes of imposing statutory
damages.6 3 The court held, "When the copyrights on the songs
can live their own copyright life" they should be treated
separately for the purposes of awarding statutory damages.64
While Stigwood was decided under the 1909 Copyright Act,
the test established in that case was widely adopted in similar
circumstances after the 1976 Copyright Act was passed. Several
circuits have taken an approach that looks to the economic value
of the infringed works and determines whether they "can live
their own copyright life" apart from the larger work in which it is
collected. This approach to the compilation clause of the 1976
Copyright Act was adopted in 1990 by the D.C. Circuit of the
60 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 656 (2010).
61 See id. at 141-42.
62 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976).
63 Id. at 1104.
64 Id. at 1105.
11992011]
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United States Court of Appeals in Walt Disney Co. v. Powell." In
this case, the defendant was found liable for selling T-shirts with
infringing images of Mickey and Minnie Mouse printed on
them." The images on the T-shirts were alleged to violate six
separate copyrights held by Walt Disney. 7 In deciding whether
the various images of Mickey and Minnie should be considered
part of a compilation for the purposes of awarding statutory
damages, the D.C. Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals
relied on the Second Circuit's decision in Stigwood and held that
the dispositive question in compilation clause analysis is whether
the works are "distinct, viable works with separate economic
value and copyright lives of their own.""
In 1993, the Second Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals revisited the compilation clause to determine whether
episodes of a television series constitute a compilation under the
1976 Copyright Act. In Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v.
Publications International, Ltd.," the defendant wrote a book
that involved the characters and plot lines from the television
series "Twin Peaks." The plaintiffs argued that the subject
matter that was infringed came from eight different episodes of
the show.71 The Second Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals held that each of the eight episodes of the television
series should be treated as independent works for the purposes of
calculating statutory damages.7 2 In reaching its decision, the
court held that "[t]he author of eight scripts for eight television
episodes is not limited to one award of statutory damages just
because he or she can continue the plot line from one episode to
the next . . .. In dicta, the court indicated that the
independent copyright life test established in Stigwood "may
retain some relevance under the 1976 Act in its recognition that
three songs performed in the musical would support separate
65 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[S]eparate copyrights are not distinct
works unless they can 'live their own copyright life.' ")
' Id. at 567.
67 Id.
61 Id. at 569-70.
69 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
70 Id. at 1370.
n1 Id.
72 Id. at 1381.
7 Id.
1200 [Vol. 85:1189
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statutory damages awards. . . ."74 The court, however,
distinguished Stigwood and decided the case based on other
factors such as the fact that each episode was written separately
and was aired on a weekly basis.
Later the same year, the First Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of Twin Peaks and Walt
Disney. In Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea," the court
held, that "[t]he term 'work,' is undefined under the [1976]
Copyright Act"" and used the independent economic value test to
supply that definition.7 8 The court awarded statutory damages
for the infringement of four episodes of a television show, even
though the copyrights of all four episodes were registered on one
form and the episodes were exclusively sold to video stores as a
single unit. In reaching this decision, the court also relied
heavily on the Second Circuit's holding in the Twin Peaks case
and extended that reasoning to the situation where the episodes
were written separately, but issued as a single unit.so
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits of the United States Court
of Appeals also adopted this approach in awarding separate
statutory damages for individual episodes of a television series.
In Columbia Pictures, Television v. Krypton Broadcasting of
Birmingham, Inc.," C. Elvin Feltner, President of Krypton
Broadcasting of Birmingham, was found to have infringed the
copyrights of several television series, including "Who's the
Boss?," "Silver Spoons," "Hart to Hart," and "T.J. Hooker.""
Feltner continued to air reruns of these shows after violating the
terms of Krypton Broadcasting's agreement with Columbia
Pictures, the owner of the copyrights.83 The Ninth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals held that the "independent
economic value test" is the correct test to apply in determining
what constitutes a "work" for the purposes of calculating
statutory damages under the 1976 Copyright Act and determined
7 Id.
7 See id.
76 11 F.3d 1106 (1st Cir. 1993).
7 Id. at 1116.
7 Id. at 1116-17.
* Id. at 1117-18.
o See id. at 1116-18.
81 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997).
2 Id. at 288.
83 Id.
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that each episode of a television series is a separate work, even
where the episodes were licensed as a series.84 In rejecting the
theory that a series constitutes an "anthology" or a "collection,"
the court was persuaded by the fact that the episodes were
broadcast over time "and could be repeated and rearranged at the
option of the broadcaster."8 5 Similarly, in MCA Television, Ltd. v.
Feltner," a case involving substantially the same facts as
Columbia Pictures, the Eleventh Circuit used the independent
economic value test to find that each episode of a television series
is a separate "work" for the purposes of calculating statutory
damages.
The Supreme Court has had the opportunity to review the
independent economic value test as it is applied to the calculation
of statutory damages, but it did not reach a conclusion on the
issue." In reversing the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Feltner on
the issue of whether a defendant has a constitutional right to
have statutory damages determined by a jury, Justice Thomas's
opinion retraced the independent economic value test as it was
utilized by the court.90 The Supreme Court decided the case
narrowly on the constitutional issue of whether a defendant was
entitled to a jury for these types of cases and did not approve of
or admonish the independent economic value test. The case was
thereafter remanded, and the jury, using the independent
economic value test, returned an award of statutory damages
that was significantly higher than the one initially imposed by
the court.9'
84 See id. at 295.
8 See id. at 295-96.
86 89 F.3d 766 (11th Cir. 1996).
87 C. Elvin Feltner, president of Krypton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc., was
the defendant in both cases, Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 296 n.8, and "Kojak"
and "The A Team," were likewise amongst the television series infringed in MCA
Television, 89 F.3d at 767.
" See id. at 769-70.
89 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04[E] [1] [d].
' Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 344 (1998).
" See Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc,
259 F.3d 1186, 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2001); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 14-04 [C] [3] [a].
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2. Rejection of the Independent Economic Value Test for Music
When faced with a compilation clause question in the digital
music context, the Second Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals distinguished Stigwood and Twin Peaks and rejected the
independent economic value test. In Bryant v. Media Right
Productions, Inc.,92 the court held that songs issued on an album
should be treated as a compilation, regardless of whether they
are independently copyrighted or sold individually.9 3 In Bryant,
the defendant, Media Right Productions ("Media Right"),
represented the creators of two folk-music albums.9 4 Media Right
contracted with plaintiffs to market their albums,95 but that
contract only covered marketing and distribution of physical
copies of the albums, not digital copies.96 Media Right, however,
contracted with a third party, Orchard, to sell copies of the
plaintiffs' songs in any format. Orchard initially sold only
physical copies of the albums, but after four years, began
selling the albums and individual songs through internet-based
retailers such as iTunes. Orchard never told Media Right or the
plaintiffs about these internet sales.98 In total, forty songs were
infringed and resold on the internet.99  While the court
recognized that digital copies of the songs were sold individually,
the court held that an album created by the plaintiff is a
compilation and therefore eligible for only one statutory damages
award. co In rejecting the independent economic value test, the
court repeatedly stated that treating songs on an album as
independent works would undermine the intent of Congress in
1976.101 In Bryant, the court did not address whether the songs
92 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 656 (2010).
9 See id. at 142.
1 See id. at 138.
" See id.
96 See id.
1 See id. at 138-39.
' See id.
9 See id. at 137-38.
199 See id. at 140-41 ("An album falls within the 11976 Copyright] Act's
expansive definition of compilation. An album is a collection of preexisting
materials-songs-that are selected and arranged by the author in a way that
results in an original work of authorship-the album.").
101 See id. at 142 ("[To award statutory damages on a per-song basis would
'make a total mockery of Congress' express mandate that all parts of a compilation
must be treated as a single "work" for purposes of computing statutory damages.'")
(quoting UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.
2000)).
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were written and produced separately, as they did in Twin Peaks.
In distinguishing Twin Peaks, the court held that the dispositive
question is whether "the plaintiff-the copyright holder-issued
[the] works separately, or together as a unit."102 This was also
the dispositive question in WB Music Corp. v. RTV
Communication Group, Inc.,1o3 where the same court awarded
separate statutory damages for each of thirteen songs where the
songs were compiled by the infringer, and the plaintiffs never
released the songs on a single album.104
3. Problems Caused by Bryant's Rejection of the Independent
Economic Value Test
The court's reasoning in Bryant causes four distinct
problems that undermine the core purposes of copyright
protection and add to the confusion and inconsistency involved
with calculating statutory damages awards. First, by treating
the infringement of all songs on an album as infringement of a
single work, copyright owners are placed in a very difficult
evidentiary position if they must prove actual damages where
statutory damages are so low as to be unfair compensation. The
United States Government Accountability Office, acting under a
government mandate to provide information on the economic
impact of piracy, recently stated, "[T]he illicit nature of
counterfeiting and piracy makes estimating the economic impact
of IP infringements extremely difficult . . .. [Most experts
observed that it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the
economy-wide impacts."0 s The illicit nature of counterfeiting and
piracy creates a similar problem when attempting to calculate
actual damages and profits of the defendant in copyright
infringement cases. The losses suffered by the copyright owner
are difficult to calculate, especially in peer-to-peer file sharing
cases, because it is impossible to determine how many copies of
the infringed songs have been distributed and how many illegal
102 Id. at 141.
103 445 F.3d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 2006).
10 See id. (holding that an award of statutory damages on a per-song basis is
appropriate where the infringer, and not the copyright owner, is the party who
assembled the songs on to an album).
105 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT
AND PIRATED GOODS (2010).
[Vol. 85:11891204
COPYRIGHT'S COMPILATION CONUNDRUM
downloaders would have purchased songs from the plaintiff.10
Proving the ill-gotten profits is another incredibly difficult task,
because it requires the plaintiff to provide proof of the infringer's
gross revenue. 0 7 Congress granted Plaintiffs the power to seek
statutory damages at any point in the litigation, regardless of
proof of actual damages, precisely because of these difficulties.'08
But limiting the available damages to such potentially low
amounts fails to provide adequate protection to the copyright
owner.
Second, by limiting the recovery of statutory damages to a
single award, regardless of the number of songs that are
infringed, the compilation clause offers a unique "bulk discount"
to infringers. A would-be infringer who is only interested in
copying songs A and B on an album has no reason to stop there.
As the Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals
currently construes the law,'09 the compilation clause provides an
incentive to the infringer also to copy songs C through Z, without
incurring any additional liability. Such a broad interpretation of
the compilation clause is thus a weak deterrent to copyright
infringement in the digital marketplace.
The bulk discount problem is especially troubling in the case
of "greatest hits" albums. Often bands who have achieved a
degree of success and longevity will select and arrange
preexisting songs on a greatest hits album. The bulk discount for
infringers is especially attractive in these situations because the
infringer can copy a high number of a successful band's best-
selling songs," 0 while incurring the risk of only a single
106 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1052-53
(D. Minn. 2010).
107 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(a) (West 2011).
10 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04 [A].
"o See Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 656 (2010).
11 For example, the album 1 contains twenty-seven songs by the Beatles that
each hit number one on the charts in the United States and the United Kingdom.
Each of these songs has tremendous independent economic value. The collection
features songs that were originally released on twelve separate albums. A
commercial infringer could reap tremendous rewards from the copying and sale of
these twenty-seven songs; but due to the fact that the songs were collected and
arranged by the copyright owner on a single album, the infringer would face a single
award of statutory damages.
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statutory-damages award. A willful infringer for profit, like the
defendants in Bryant, has little to fear from civil remedies..
when facing such money-making potential.
The third troubling result of an expansive definition of
"compilation" is the arbitrary manner in which statutory
damages are issued when numerous songs are infringed. If each
song on an album gives rise to a single statutory award, but
songs from other albums give rise to separate statutory awards,
then an infringer who illegally copies ten songs from one album
and five songs from other albums can be held liable for six
statutory awards. Under the Second Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals's interpretation, no consideration would be
given to how the songs were copied or whether the infringer gave
any consideration to which albums these songs came from. Given
the fact that an infringer is susceptible to different levels of
statutory damages based on whether he or she knowingly
infringed a work,112 then it should matter whether the infringer
thought that all of the songs that he or she was downloading
came from the same album. In this situation, a strict
interpretation of the compilation clause could allow for the
argument that the infringer only intended to copy one album. If
that were proven to be the case, then the court may be compelled
to find willful infringement for the ten songs that actually were
from the album and ordinary infringement of the other five
songs. Such distinctions would be completely arbitrary.
Finally, the Second Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals's approach leaves the most vulnerable class of artists
susceptible to deception by infringers. Recently, in Arista
Records L.L.C. v. Lime Group L.L.C.,1 3 the Southern District of
New York narrowed the holding in Bryant, stating that where
the copyright owner sells its songs individually over the internet,
he or she may seek statutory damages on a per-song basis.11 4 In
Arista, Judge Kimba Wood-who authored the Bryant opinion-
stated that the key factor is whether the copyright owner ever
distributed the songs individually, and since the artists in Bryant
n. Criminal penalties exist for willful infringement for profit. The burden of
proof, however, is higher, and often the parties harmed by the infringement are best
situated to recognize the problem and pursue a remedy.
112 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(2).
1n. No. 06 CV 5936, 2011 WL 1311771 (S.D.N.Y. April 4, 2011).
114 Id. at *3.
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only issued the songs as albums, not online, they were not
entitled to recover damages on a per-song basis.115 While the
Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has not yet
ruled on whether to accept this limitation, the limitation itself
offers no protection to plaintiffs like the ones in Bryant who are
most vulnerable to unscrupulous managers. Often, when a new
artist is starting out in the music business, that artist places a
great deal of trust in the decisions of a business manager. If the
manager advises the artist to sell physical albums for a period of
time, that manager can then sell the songs online, unbeknownst
to the artist, and when the manger gets caught, he will only be
liable for a single statutory damages award.
This exact situation occurred in Bryant."' The fact that this
particular plaintiffs' album sales were modest persuaded the
court that the statutory damages available were ample
compensation."' In the case of a hit debut album, however, the
artist might lose out on millions-because of statutory
limitations on damages-because a manager uses his or her
position to gain an unjust personal profit.
B. The Problem of the Willful Standard
While the issue of whether statutory damages should be
awarded on a per-song or a per-album basis creates uncertainty
in copyright infringement litigation in the digital music context,
that issue should not be resolved in such a way that would
magnify the problem of often excessively high and arbitrary
statutory-damages awards. The district courts have struggled to
find a meaningful standard for measuring the amount of
statutory damages that are appropriate when a plaintiff has
proven willful infringement of music through the digital
marketplace.118 The 1976 Copyright Act contains broad ranges
1" See id. at *3-4.
116 See Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 137-39 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 656 (2010).
I" See id. at 144 ("The District Court awarded a total of $2400 in statutory
damages, based on its finding that Appellees' profits from infringing sales of the
Albums and songs were meager, and that the award did not need to be higher to
achieve deterrence, because deterrence was effectuated here by Appellees having to
pay their own attorneys fees.") (affirming lower court's damage award).
118 See NIMMER & NIMMER, sapra note 4, § 14-04[B](1)(a) (explaining that courts
generally disregard "willful" increases and "innocent" decreases in the amount of
statutory damages available). See also id. § 14-04[BlI(3)(a) (outlining disagreement
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for statutory damages. The initial statutory-damages range for
copyright infringement is $750 to $30,000, with a significant
increase to $150,000 in maximum damages for willful
infringement."' The Act provides no guidance, however, as to
where in that range damages should lie, and it leaves broad
discretion to the court to determine a "just" award.12 0 The courts
weigh a variety of factors when deciding the amount of statutory
damages, including the expense saved and profits reaped by the
defendant, the lost profits of the plaintiff, the infringer's state of
mind, and the violation of contractual obligations.' 2 ' Three major
problems exist with the way that statutory damages are
currently awarded for copyright infringement. The first problem
is that the factors are not weighed uniformly across, or even
within, the circuit courts, yielding inconsistent results for similar
infringing acts.122 Second, there is disagreement as to whether
statutory damages should bear a connection to actual damages
and whether any punitive aspect should be served by statutory
damages. 12 3  Third, while the Supreme Court has held that a
defendant is entitled to a jury on the issue of statutory damages,
courts have repeatedly remitted jury awards in cases where
individual users are held liable for willful infringement of digital
among the courts over issues such as whether "willfulness" in this context includes
"reckless disregard" and "constructive knowledge," and whether willfulness can be
established at the summary judgment stage).
n1 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c) (West 2011).
120 See id.
121 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14-04[B](1)(a).
122 Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 19, at 485-86 ("Inconsistent statutory
damage rulings in factually similar cases are . . . easy to find. In one set of cases, the
same recording industry firm challeng[ed] comparable acts of infringement
(continuing to make and sell records after a compulsory license was terminated) and
obtained statutory damage awards of $10,000 per infringed work in one case,
$30,000 per infringed work in another, and $50,000 per infringed work in a third. No
effort was made to align the awards or explain the discrepancies.").
123 Compare Walker v. Forbes, Inc., 28 F.3d 409, 415 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the purpose behind statutory damages under 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c) is restitution,
not punitive damages, and a charge on deterring infringement through statutory
damages would have been improper), with Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset,
680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (D. Minn. 2010) ("[F]actors other than the damages
caused and gains obtained by the defendant's infringement are relevant to the
decision of the proper amount of statutory damages. Facts that go to the deterrence
aspect of statutory damages, such as a defendant's willfulness or innocence, and
incorrigibility, are also relevant.").
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music, calling the jury awards excessively high. 24 What results
from these divergent interpretations, then, is inconsistency and
inefficiency of process.
Each of these problems, and the resulting inconsistency and
inefficiency are exemplified in the case of Capitol Records Inc. v.
Thomas-Rasset.125 In Capitol Records, the defendant was found
liable for willful infringement of twenty-four of the plaintiffs
1261 h
copyrighted songs. In the first trial of this lawsuit, the jury
awarded statutory damages of $222,000 or $9,250 for each song
that was infringed.127 The court, however, granted a new trial on
the issue of an error in jury instructions.12 8 At the second trial,
the jury returned a verdict of $1,920,000 or $80,000 per song
infringed.129 The court then remitted that verdict to $2,250 per
song infringed.13 0 The plaintiff rejected remittur.131 Ultimately,
a third trial ended with a jury verdict of $1,500,000 or $62,500
per song.132 In a pre-trial hearing, the district court denied the
defendant's request that the jury be instructed, "Your award of
statutory damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the
harm suffered by each plaintiff as a result of the defendant's
actions."133  Later that year, however, defendants submitted a
motion to alter or amend the judgment, stating, "This award
violates the Due Process Clause because it bears no reasonable
relationship to the actual damages that the defendant caused."134
This case has now spanned three trials, over three years of
litigation, statutory damages awards ranging from $2,250 to
$80,000 per song, countless dollars in attorney's fees, and there is
still no final resolution is in sight.
124 See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 93-94
(D. Mass. 2010); Capitol Records, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1056-57, 1061.
125 Capitol Records, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045.
126 See id. at 1049-50.
127 See id. at 1049.
128 See id.
129 See id. at 1050.
13 See id. at 1061.
13 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (MJD[LIB), 2010 WL
4236632, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 13, 2010).
132 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (MJD/LIB), 2010 WL
4392184 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2010).
133 Capitol Records, 2010 WL 4236632, at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134 Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment and Renewed Motion for Judgment
as a Matter of Law, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497, 2010 WL
5147986 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2010).
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It is abundantly clear that the often-amended Copyright Act
is in need of further amendment. In attempting to apply
outdated legislation to a very modern problem, the courts have
devised two entirely different tests for determining what
constitutes a "compilation." In applying 1976 reasoning to the
problems created by internet piracy, the Bryant court reached a
decision that compromises the interest of the copyright owner,
creates an incentive for wholesale infringement of sound
recordings, and promotes arbitrary line drawing. The Capitol
Records litigation shows how the 1976 Copyright Act, as
currently amended, leads to inconsistent results, judicial
inefficiency, and poor guidance for juries that must calculate
statutory damages awards.
III. Two CLARIFICATIONS THAT WILL BRING 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)
INTO THE DIGITAL ERA
This Note advocates a two-part solution that will provide
guidance on damages to judges and juries in copyright
infringement cases. This solution satisfies the policies of
protecting copyright owners and deterring infringement that
have been at the heart of United States copyright law since the
eighteenth century, and it also satisfies the tripartite general
purpose for statutory damages. First, Congress should separate
"collections" from "collective works" and distinguish between the
two for purposes of calculating statutory damages. Second,
Congress should redefine the current ranges of statutory
damages under the Copyright Act and recalibrate the statutory
limits accordingly. In place of innocent infringement, ordinary
infringement, and willful infringement, this solution would
establish ranges for innocent infringement, knowing
infringement, and willful infringement for commercial advantage
or personal financial gain. This addresses the concern that
eliminating the compilation clause would increase the likelihood
of unfairly high results against individuals in peer-to-peer file
sharing cases.
A. Differentiating Between Collections and Collective Works
Even under the 1976 Copyright Act as currently written and
amended, the definition of a "compilation" does not contemplate
songs on an album in the modern digital marketplace. The 1976
Act defines a compilation as "a work formed by the collection and
1210 [Vol. 85:1189
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assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term
'compilation' includes collective works."135 The terms "materials"
and "data" indicate information that might not otherwise be
subject to copyright protection.1 36 Congress used them to protect
original works that are created by compiling existing materials
with some degree of creativity and those who compile them, 13 1
but only to the extent that the author added something new to
the compilation. 13 8 This premise carries over to the definition of a
collective work.139
The 1976 Copyright Act's definition of collective work-"a
work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in
which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective
whole,"' 40-lists only printed materials. Moreover, each of the
"collective works" that are enumerated in the Act are composed
of parts that traditionally have minimal economic value apart
from some sort of a collection. For example, a single article has
little economic value if not published in a periodical or
encyclopedia and a single poem would rarely be published apart
from an anthology or magazine. These "traditional" printed
compilations were among those afforded statutory damages on a
per-infringing act basis under the 1909 Act that prompted
Congress to adopt the compilation clause in the 1976 Act. Sound
recordings, television shows, and live performances all existed in
' See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2011).
136 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 3.02.
137 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 11 (1976) ("A compilation or derivative work is
copyrightable if it represents an 'original work of authorship.' "); see also Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("Original, as the term
is used in copyright, means only that the work . .. possesses at least some minimal
degree of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low;
even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite
easily, as they possess some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble or obvious
it might be.") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"3 See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2006) ("The copyright in a compilation or derivative
work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not
imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.").
139 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 3.03 ("A collective work will qualify
for copyright by reason of the original effort expended in the process of compilation,
even if no new matter is added.").
140 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
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1976, and any of these could have easily been listed, but were
not. The Copyright Act specifically names "sound recordings" in
numerous other areas, including entire sections on licensing,
distribution, and notice requirements. 4 ' While the list is not
exhaustive, the omission of sound recordings should not be
viewed as incidental.
Even apart from the fact that the enumerated examples of
collective works include only printed materials comprised of
parts with minimal independent economic value, albums no
longer fit the mold of a "collective whole." Periodicals,
anthologies, encyclopedias, and other units that have been
considered collective works such as catalogs, and magazinesl 42 all
share the common thread of reaching consumers as a single unit.
This is no longer the case for albums. Brick-and-mortar record
stores are rapidly disappearing, 4 3 but music consumption is
as high as it has ever been.'44 In the digital marketplace,
consumers purchase individual songs with far greater frequency
than they purchase entire albums. 45 Moreover, songs reach
consumers individually in more ways than simply in the context
of an album. For example, songs are available for individual sale
on websites like iTunes (over 18 million songs are currently sold
on iTunes);'46 they reach consumers in the form of video games
(not only on soundtracks, but also as the main function of
141 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 402 (2006).
142 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 3.03.
143 See Alex Vadukul, Virgin Megastore's Last Days: Farewell to NYC's Big
Record Shop, ROLLINGSTONE.COM (Jun. 12, 2009, 10:11 AM), http://www.
rollingstone.com/music/news/virgin-megastores-last-days-farewell-to-nycs-big-record
-shop-20090612.
144 See Performance Right Hearings, supra note 1, at 18 ("[Dlespite the
industry's woes, people are listening to at least as much music as ever. [People
bought] more than 100 million iPods" between January 2009 and January 2010, and
the touring business is thriving.).
145 In the first week that iTunes made a digitally re-mastered version of the
Beatles catalog available, over 2 million individual tracks were sold, compared with
450,000 digital albums. Christopher Morris, Beatles Sell 2 Mil iTunes Tracks in
One Week, VARIETY (Nov. 23, 2010, 2:53 PM), http://www.variety.com/article/
VR1118027940. According to Nielson Soundscan, of the 1,545,000,000 total music
units sold in 2009, 1,159,000,000 were digital tracks (individual songs) and
76,400,000 were digital albums. Press Release, Nielsen Company, 2009 U.S. Music
Purchases up 2.1% over 2008; Music Sales Exceed 1.5 Billion for Second Consecutive
Year (Jan 7, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/
Nielsen-Music-2009-Year-End-Press-Release.pdf.
146 What is iTunes?, APPLE.cOM, http://www.apple.com/itunes/what-is (last
visited Feb. 1, 2012).
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popular games such as Guitar Hero and Rock Band);" and they
are sold in the form of ring tones.'48 The digital marketplace has
changed music consumption to such a degree that even the
traditional means of distributing individual songs-such as
broadcast and videos, which were once seen as a means of
promoting album sales-no longer serve that function. 141
Perhaps, in 1976, when songs were primarily available as a part
of a single physical object, either vinyl album, cassette, or eight-
track, which generally contained multiple songs, the compilation
clause made sense for infringement of the album; however, this is
no longer the case. In the digital marketplace, each song is an
independent unit for sale.
Songs on an album, much like episodes of a television show,
should be considered a "collection" not a "compilation." The
classic example of a compilation is a doll in which the
manufacturer owns separate copyrights in the various sculpted
limbs.' In this case the owner would be entitled to a single
recovery of statutory damages if the doll is infringed. This is
because the doll is a single unit for sale. In the modern digital
marketplace, songs on an album are much more akin to episodes
of a television show-considered independent works for the
purposes of statutory damages by all circuits that have
considered the question" 1'-than they are to a doll or an
encyclopedia. While the items may be marketed as a part of a
greater collection, they are still made available to consumers
independently from all other parts of the collection.
' "[Mbtley Crie] placed its new single, 'Saints of Los Angeles,' for sale as a
downloadable track on [the video game] 'Rock Band' well in advance of the album's
release date .... [Tihe track was downloaded more than 47,000 times via the Xbox
360 version of the game alone in the first week after it became available." Antony
Bruno, Game Theory: Can Introducing New Music Through Videogames Boost
Sales?, BILLBOARD, May 31, 2008, at 22, 22.
"' "In 2006, the RIAA launched the Master Ringtone Sales Award, updating its
47-year old Gold and Platinum program to recognize the growing popularity of
enjoying music through cellular phones." History of the Awards, RECORDING
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, http://www.riaa.com/goldandplatinum.php?
content selector=historyx (last visited Feb. 1, 2012); see also Performance Right
Hearings, supra note, 1 at 18-19.
'9 See id. ("Today listeners are not limited to what they hear on traditional
radio to inform their choices. Consequently, whatever promotional value that may
have existed in 1995 has been diluted by the increase in alternative media. . .
150 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04[E](1)(d).
1' See id. § II[A](1), (2).
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The independent economic value test should be used to
determine whether the component parts constitute a "collective
whole." If the parts have independent economic value, thereby
making each part capable of its own copyright life, then taken as
a whole, the parts would constitute a "collection." If the parts
lack sufficient independent economic value, then they would
constitute a "compilation" and only a single award of statutory
damages should be allowed.
In order to implement this solution in a manner that
makes sense, two things must happen. First, an addition to
17 U.S.C. § 101 should define a collection as "a series of separate
and independent works that are collected and arranged by the
author, but which maintain significant independent economic
value apart from the collective whole." This would sufficiently
differentiate between a traditional compilation, which is a single
work made up of component parts, and a collection, which
consists of independent works that are gathered together for
marketing purposes or as a part of a greater narrative, but do not
necessarily form a "collective whole" because they are not
dependent on the collection for economic value. Second, a
sentence should be added to the end of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) that
states, For purposes of this subsection, all parts of a collection
should be treated as independent works.
B. Recategorizing Levels of Infringement
The 1976 Copyright Act currently provides statutory
damages at different levels for infringers who are innocent,
willful, or less than willful. The statute establishes an initial
range for statutory damages of not less than $750 and not more
than $30,000 per infringed work.152 The maximum increases to
$150,000 per infringed work where the plaintiff can prove that
the infringer acted willfully and decreases the minimum to $200
per infringed work if the defendant can prove that the
infringement was innocent.153  This essentially creates three
categories of infringement: innocent, knowing, and willful.'5 4 The
152 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (West 2011).
153 Id. § 504(c)(2).
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04[B1(1)(a).
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Act, however, leaves broad discretion to the judge or jury,"'
which has raised criticism about the application of statutory
damages in the modern copyright infringement context. 5 6
The public's fear of unfair damage awards against consumers
was a factor in Congress's decision to keep the compilation
clause,' but a statutory provision that expressly treats
infringement for personal use separately from infringement for
profit or commercial gain could alleviate those fears. This
Note advocates replacing the "willful" level with separate
distinctions for (1) knowing infringement, and (2) willful
infringement for commercial advantage or personal financial
gain. Under the 1976 Copyright Act, willful infringement means
"with knowledge that the defendant's conduct constitutes
copyright infringement."15 8  This creates an uneasy merger
between the legal standards of "knowing" and "willful" that
essentially usurps any real meaning from the statutory increase
in damages. 159 In many contexts, the term "willful" implies an
added malicious intent on top of knowledge of a breach of legal
duty.160  Congress, however, has eliminated this intent
requirement from its definition of willful copyright infringement.
Without malicious intent, which would equate to financial or
commercial gain resulting from the infringing activity, there is
little value to the "willful" distinction in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)
because virtually all illegal downloads involve a knowledge of
copyright infringement, and innocent infringement requires
showing "no reason to know" of the infringement, which the
courts rarely find.'6 1
In order to correct this situation and offer meaningful
distinctions in the levels of statutory damages available to
plaintiffs, the highest level of damages should be reserved for
155 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) uses the phrase "as the court considers just." The term
"court" has been held to imply determination by a judge in certain contexts, but the
Supreme Court has held that defendants have a constitutional right to a jury
determination of statutory damages if they so choose. See Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1998).
156 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 19.
157 See O'Scamlain & Halpert, supra note 29 ("[Eliminating the compilation
clause] would subject someone who illegally downloads the contents of a compact
disc to possible statutory damages for each song on the disc.").
158 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04[B](3)(a).
159 See id.
1oo JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 129-30 (5th ed. 2009).
161 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 14.04[B1(1)(a).
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willful infringement for commercial advantage or personal
financial gain. This standard is consistent with the distinctions
made in criminal parts of the 1976 Copyright Act as currently
amended. 16 2 By expressly acknowledging this distinction in its
criminal treatment of copyright infringement, Congress already
recognizes the important distinction between infringement for
profit and infringement for personal use. With this recognition
already established, it makes sense to use this standard as a line
of demarcation for the purposes of statutory damages as well.
Willful infringers for profit, who take the risk of criminal liability
for profit or commercial gain, are the ones most deserving of
maximum civil penalties, not only because they act with
malicious intent, but also because they cause the most damage to
the rightful copyright owner.
If the for-profit distinction were made, that would greatly
reduce the risk of unfairly excessive penalties against end-user
infringement in the absence of the compilation clause's single
award protection for infringement of multiple songs on an album.
To further prevent absurd results, knowing infringement, which
equates to the current "willful infringement" standard, should
have a more reasonable maximum allowable penalty. This Note
advocates a range of $750 to $2,250 per work for knowing
infringement. The $2,250 limit, three times the statutory
minimum, is consistent with the "broad legal practice of
establishing a treble award as the upper limit permitted to
address willful or particularly damaging behavior."16 3 Adopting
this provision in conjunction with the updated definition of a
"compilation" would create a meaningful basis for increasing the
level of statutory damages, as the highest awards would be
reserved for the worst offenders. It would also offer a level of
assurance against unconscionable levels of damages against
162 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II) (defining criminal infringement as
infringement that was committed "for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain").
163 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1056. In
Capitol Records, the court explained, "Federal statutes allow for an increase in
statutory damages, up to triple statutory damages, when the statutory
violation . .. demonstrates a particular need for deterrence." Id.; see also Software
Freedom Conservancy, Inc. v. Best Buy Co., No. 09 Civ. 10155(SAS), 2010 WL
2985320, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Without a better guide for setting enhanced
damages, the Court will award treble damages on the basis of... willful
infringement....").
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individuals who download music, movies, or television shows for
personal use, while maintaining enough of a penalty to deter the
infringement of even a single copyrighted work.
C. Why this Solution Is Better than Other Proposals
Congress and the judiciary have struggled with the problem
of protecting musicians from digital piracy for years, and
Congress and legal commentators have noticed. Several
solutions to the problem of how to deal with online infringement
of copyrighted music have been proposed, but each has its
shortcomings. Three solutions that were recently proposed
include expansion of the performance right for sound
recordings, 164 a common-law guidepost for tying statutory
damages calculations directly to actual damages,1 65  and
eliminating the compilation clause altogether.1 66
1. Expansion of the Performance Right
The performance right grants the copyright holder the
exclusive right to perform the copyrighted work publicly.'
Originally, sound recordings were not included in the
performance right.6 s In 1995, Congress enacted the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 ("DPRA"),
which granted a limited performance right in sound recordings to
the extent that the sound recordings are disseminated in an
online or satellite broadcast. 6 9 Under this limited performance
right, digital broadcasters are required to pay the copyright
holder for a license to broadcast the songs.170 Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights, has suggested that the digital
performance right in sound recordings be extended to cover all
forms of broadcast, including terrestrial broadcasts.'71 Peters
'" See Performance Right Hearings, supra note 1, at 23 (Statement of MaryBeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights).
165 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 19, at 502-03.
166 See H.R. 4279, 110th Cong. § 104 (2007).
167 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006).
168 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (West 2011) ("[Sound recordings] do not include any right
of performance under section 106(4).").
161 See Performance Right Hearings, supra note 1, at 16-17.
170 See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
17 See Performance Right Hearings, supra note 1, at 19 (prepared statement of
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, Washington, D.C.).
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noted that the primary reason for the exclusion of terrestrial
broadcasts from the DPRA was the "mutually beneficial economic
relationship between the recording and traditional broadcasting
industries,"'72 which promoted album sales for the performer by
building popularity over the radio. Peters goes on to explain how
that relationship has deteriorated to the detriment of the music
industry.17 While the expansion of the performance right is a
viable means for adding an alternative source of income to
musicians, it does not address the issue of infringement. This
proposed solution concedes that artists lose significant revenue
due to online infringement and attempts to recover some of that
lost revenue by adding an additional revenue stream. It does
nothing, however, to discourage infringement. Moreover, it does
not address the difficult position that courts are put in when
copyright holders decide to bring a suit against an infringer.
2. General Recalibration of Statutory Damages
Recently, Professor Samuelson proposed a multi-faceted set
of guidelines that would recalibrate the way that statutory
damages are awarded and generally tie the awards to actual
damages. 74 The stance that statutory damages should be tied
closely to actual damages diminishes the deterrence aspect of
statutory damages. At first blush, it makes sense that statutory
damages should bear a resemblance to actual damages, but this
is not the way that courts have interpreted statutory damages in
copyright infringement cases."' The difficulties in calculating
actual damages are well documented"' and, if taken to their
logical extreme, can lead to even greater damages incurred by
172 Id.
17 See id. at 19-22.
114 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 19, at 501-05.
176 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053
(D. Minn. 2010) ("[F]actors other than the damages caused and gains obtained by
the defendant's infringement are relevant to the decision of the proper amount of
statutory damages. Facts that go to the deterrence aspect of statutory damages, such
as a defendant's willfulness or innocence, and incorrigibility, are also relevant.");
Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Cody, No. 1:08-cv-00590-LJO-SMS, 2009 WL 3650923,
*5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2009) ("The statutory damages serve both compensatory and
punitive purposes, so in order to effectuate the statutory policy of discouraging
infringement, recovery of statutory damages is permitted even absent evidence of
the actual damages suffered by a plaintiff or of the profits reaped by a defendant.")
(citing L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir.
1998)).
176 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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the infringer. At least one plaintiff has testified that
infringement of a single song can cost the copyright owner an
immeasurable amount of damages because of the ripple effect of
file sharing.'77 Moreover, in order to implement this
recalibration of damages without amending the statute,
Professor Samuelson lays out a complex scheme for relating the
statutory damages award to proof of actual damages in different
situations."' Among the twenty-two affirmative guideposts'7 9
are: (1) "[c]onsider awarding the reduced minimum damages
authorized for 'innocent' infringements in close fair use cases or
in other cases in which the noninfringement claim was strong,
even if ultimately not compelling";' (2) "[award minimum
statutory damages when] the defendant had a plausible fair use
or other noninfringement argument (unless the plaintiffs lost
profits or defendant's profits justify a larger award)";' and
(3) "[blase any enhanced statutory damage award for 'willful
infringement' on multiples above two to three times
damages/profits or a best approximation, but only to the extent
there are factors showing egregiousness of the infringement
beyond the fact that the defendant knew his acts were
infringing .... " While the professor's solution is well thought
out, it is far too complex, particularly in cases where juries,
instead of judges, are calculating the award. Even Professor
Samuelson concedes that a legislative solution may be needed to
offer proper guidance to the courts. 83
3. Elimination of the Compilation Clause
Simply striking the compilation clause and inserting the
independent economic value test, as proposed recently by
Congress,'8 4 is a poor solution because it over emphasizes the
deterrence purpose of statutory damages to a point where absurd
177 See Capitol Records, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1052-53.
17 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 19, at 501-03.
"' In addition to the twenty-two guideposts for what courts should do, Professor
Samuelson also lists sixteen guideposts for what courts should not do. See id. at
505-08.
1so Id. at 501.
181 Id. at 502.
182 Id. at 504.
183 Id. at 509-10.
184 H.R. 4279, 110th Cong. § 104 (2007).
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results could ensue.1 85 To allow statutory damage awards in the
millions of dollars for downloading a handful of songs is not only
unfair to the defendant, but also results in damages awards that
could never realistically be paid, thus doing the plaintiff little
good. The distinction between commercial infringers for profit
and private infringers is essential to any proposition that would
remove the compilation clause from 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
CONCLUSION
The United States has consistently approached copyright as
an area of the law that must be frequently updated in order to
keep pace with new technologies. The recent technological shift
to the online marketplace has rapidly made prior copyright
legislation obsolete. Congress has already undertaken measures
in recent years to address this constantly changing problem, and
more changes are in the works. Members of Congress have
specifically named the compilation clause as an area that is in
need of resolution in the near future. The time is ripe for a
statutory solution to the problems caused by applying a 1976
solution to a 2011 problem.
The two-part solution advocated by this Note addresses all of
the major shortcomings of the present approach to statutory
damages for the infringement of music in the digital
marketplace. This solution is in line with existing statutory
language, the purposes of copyright protection, and the purposes
of statutory damages, generally. This solution also avoids many
of the thorny issues that arise from other solutions that have
recently been proposed. If the Copyright Act were amended in
the manner set forth in this Note, judges and juries; copyright
holders and would-be infringers; artists; producers; and
consumers alike would have an added level of certainty and
protection that is currently lacking. The next wave of new
technology will undoubtedly cry out for new solutions at a later
date, but the problems that currently exist can and should be
resolved now.
18" Without the "for profit" distinction, an individual infringer for personal use
could be held liable for damages in the amount of $2,250,000 for downloading a
single album containing fifteen songs. While a court would likely remit these
damages, the solution proposed in this Note avoids this situation altogether.
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